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ABSTRACT
The issues, the activities and the relations preceding the formal interna-
tional negotiations have increasingly become an area of a special theo-
retical interest.  The prenegotiation or the prenegotiation phase is part of
the broader issue of the dynamic interactive process of international
negotiations. The Southeast European region or the Balkans, in particular
its people and political leaders, could utilize much of the conceptual
experience of prenegotiating in coping with the multitude of major and
minor real and potential conflicts and other issues.  Prenegotiations pro-
vide an opportunity to approach and be involved in managing significant
issues, including conflicts, without taking the risk of formal commitments,
as well as facilitating the very negotiations in areas as determining the
participants, the agenda, etc.  A basic benefit from prenegotiations by all
parties is the possibility to understand better the specific mechanism of
shaping the partner’s and the own party’s commitment to negotiate.
Switching from the traditional bargaining model of negotiations to the
problem-solving model in the Balkans, utilizing to the most the third-party
capacity and the seminar and workshop experience of dealing with partic-
ular issues in an informal way are special accents in the prenegotiation
potential applied to Southeast European issues.
Introduction
The complex, systemic interdependence of the national and
the regional levels of security in the Balkans and a similar inten-
sive relationship with the Euro Atlantic and the global levels of
security naturally make the conflicts in the turbulent Southeastern
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Europe in the end of this and at the dawn of the new century a
special target of conflict management interest. However, the
’magic clue’ to an effective conflict management and resolution
in the Balkans – hence, to the broader security in this region of
Europe is not just a short and concise political or politico-military
formula. It would not originate only from the rich conflict realm of
the Balkans and would not just stem from the intensive interest of
powerful external to the region actors. Any longer-term conflict
resolution in the Balkans needs to address the roots and the
sources of the conflict-rich environment of the peninsula. If, any-
way, there ought to be a formula – it should be a combination of
a ’therapy’ and ’region-building’ approaches to curing the actual
conflicts and gradually draining their sources by constructing a
compatible European region from the Balkans – prosperous and
democratic enough, with a modern economy and infrastructure to
share equal responsibility with the other parts of Europe (Pantev,
1998, pp. 240-259).
Negotiating to prevent and manage conflicts in the Balkans,
coping with a vast array of post-conflict reconstruction and rec-
onciliation issues as well as channeling the region-building activ-
ity in Southeastern Europe all necessitate an enhanced interna-
tional negotiation potential for all actors in the area that need to
be stimulated, educated and catalyzed. The three different kinds
of negotiating activity in the Balkans have specific reflections on
the prenegotiation activity and theory and vice versa – an issue
that further needs to be scrutinized and thought over. The pace,
the contents and the direction of the negotiation process is influ-
enced by various factors: foreign-policy bureaucracy in the indi-
vidual negotiating countries, the personal peculiarities of the very
negotiators, the international-political environment of the on-
going negotiations and the different pressures it creates for the
negotiating parties, etc. The system constituted by the interactive
relationship of the negotiating parties is certainly one of these fac-
tors and all the prenegotiating activity before formal negotiations
have begun does matter in shaping and understanding the actu-
al negotiation process.
Though an “encompassing” and “thorough” theory of the
processes of prenegotiation has not been formulated yet there is
no reason to refrain from using the achievements, the propositions
and the potential in general of this vital precursor of practically all
international negotiations and apply them to the conflict-rich post-
Cold War world.
The research tasks of this article are the following:
First, to sum up in short the existing opinions on the defini-
tions, stages and functions in the literature of this field and share
personal positions on these issues, stemming from the literature in

























negotiation practices and opportunities in Southeastern Europe.
Second, to outline the theoretic areas within the discussed
topics which presently seem most urgent to be related to the var-
ious issues of stability and belated modernization and prosperity
of the Balkan region. The need to solve a multitude of individual
issues in this part of Europe, the broader and perspective task of
knitting together the fabric of the subregional security community
call for improved international negotiation processes, including
prenegotiations.
Third, to add to the continuing theoretic discussion about
prenegotiations the argument, derived from the specific regional
interrelationships that during the prenegotiations the bargaining
approach to the negotiations should necessarily give way to the
problem-solving one.  No matter how ’unrealistic’ it may seem for
some local politicians or for some external to the region powers,
the ’tit-for-tat’ approach of resolving conflicts would require
decades before evolution does its job. The high complexity of the
bargaining situations in the troubled Balkan subregion of Europe,
and the need to overcome as soon as possible the retarded mod-
ernization, calls for more imagination and creativity to change the
concept and contents of the functions, stages and the expected
outcomes of the ongoing or future negotiations.
Definitions
The existing comparatively small literature about international
prenegotiation in the aspect of its definition may be grouped into
two major schools of thought.1 The first one conceives interna-
tional negotiation as an integral part of the international relations
or a sub-field of international politics. It emphasizes the prenego-
tiation as an essential aspect of the context for negotiations
(Fisher, 1984, p. 56-57; Saunders, 1984, p. 47-56).
The second one, seeking to develop international negotiation
theory, is by now divided into two contending views: a) prenegoti-
ation is an initial phase or stage in the process of negotiation
(Zartman & Berman, 1982, p. 81-86; Zartman, 1989, p. 1-17);
and, b) prenegotiation is a separate process that structures the
actual process of negotiation (Stein, 1989, p. 8-43).
Harold H. Saunders tries to link the issues of prenegotiation
and negotiation itself with the conduct of diplomacy and foreign
policy. The decisions made in the broader area of diplomacy
assume a direct meaning for the negotiations and he tries to revert
to the period before a decision to negotiate is made. According
to him prenegotiation is a process, consisting of three phases: 1)
defining the problem; 2) commitment to negotiate and, 3) arrang-
ing the negotiation. A fourth phase follows – negotiation itself
(Saunders, 1984, p. 51-56).
























tional negotiations, gives the following two definitions of prene-
gotiation: Prenegotiation begins when one or more parties
considers negotiation as a policy option and communicates
this intention to other parties. It ends when the parties agree
to formal negotiations ... or when one party abandons the
consideration of negotiation as an option... In essential terms,
prenegotiation is the span of time and activity in which the
parties move from conflicting unilateral solutions for a mutual
problem to a joint search for cooperative multilateral or joint
solutions (Zartman, 1989, p. 4). In an earlier study of the nego-
tiation process I. William Zartman and Maureen Berman identify
prenegotiation with what they call the ’diagnostic phase of nego-
tiations’ (Zartman & Berman, 1982, Chapter 3).
Janice Gross Stein considers prenegotiation a separate
process, different from the actual negotiation process, though the
former decisively structures the latter. Her conclusion about the
definition of the process of prenegotiation, derived from five com-
prehensive case studies, is that it was generally characterized
by important structuring activity. It set broad boundaries, iden-
tified the participants, and, in at least half the cases, specified
the agenda for negotiation. Even in those cases where it pro-
duced only a rough outline of the agenda, it nevertheless
reduced uncertainty and complexity by establishing what
would be kept off the table. In every case, prenegotiation
framed the problem and set the limits of the negotiation to fol-
low (Stein, 1989, p. 257).
Brian W. Tomlin conceives prenegotiation as that period in
relations when negotiation is considered, and perhaps adopt-
ed, as a behavioral option by some or all of the parties... The
prenegotiation phase itself is also a process marked by turn-
ing points that move the parties through various stages of
prenegotiation... (Tomlin, 1989, p. 21). A five-stage model of
prenegotiation is most characteristic of Brian Tomlin’s view, start-
ing with the decision of whether or not to negotiate: 1) problem
identification; 2) search for options; 3) commitment to negotiate;
4) agreement to negotiate; and 5) setting the parameters (Tomlin,
1989, p. 22-26).
Another devoted student of prenegotiations – Jay Rothman,
does not clearly join any of the two different opinions within the
international negotiation theory. Building on existing temporal,
functional, psychological, strategic, process and experimental
derived definitions, he develops an ’integrated definition’ of
prenegotiation: ... an integrated process in which highly
placed representatives of parties in conflict prepare for nego-
tiations by jointly framing their issues of conflict, generating
various options for handling them cooperatively, and interac-


























tions (Rothman, 1990, p. 4).
A leading expert of international negotiations – P. Terrence
Hopmann, when studying the issue of prenegotiations does not
formulate a particular definition. However, he highlights three
aspects of the prenegotiation characteristics that matter signifi-
cantly for the negotiation phase: 1) the influence on the prenego-
tiation phase by the tension between integrative and distributive
approach to negotiations; 2) the opportunity to utilize the prene-
gotiation phase for learning and better understanding the needs
and interests related by the negotiating parties to the problem to
be negotiated; 3) whichever doctrinal perspective is taken, the
prenegotiation phase is of real interest because of the impact that
it has on the bargaining process of the subsequent negotiation
(Hopmann, 1996, p. 174-180).
Raymond Cohen underlines a wrong approach to defining
prenegotiations – the inclination to include everything in the evo-
lution of a relationship as part of the prenegotiation phase. The
consequences of this approach are the loss of the analytical focus
of the prenegotiation concept. The proposal of R. Cohen about
the definition of prenegotiation is the preliminary contacts,
direct or indirect, initiated to prepare for a negotiation that the
parties have already agreed to undertake (Cohen, 1995, p.
50). The three accents of this definition are: 1) the agreement to
seek a negotiated solution to an existing problem; 2) the estab-
lishment of a personal relationship; and 3) the activity to prevent
surprises in the course of the negotiations.
There are no proofs by now that the difference of views tran-
scend the academic debate and reflect decisively on the practical
side of both international prenegotiations and negotiations. A fur-
ther study of the various definitions and the formulation of a com-
prehensive one may eventually lead to more substantial conclu-
sions about the practical utility of prenegotiations.
Here we wish to add two points which we consider of key
importance for the practicality of the prenegotiation theory: first,
prenegotiations may not be burdened with the expectation
that the participating parties should switch from an informal
interaction to a formal agreement to commit to a negotiated
solution of a mutual problem. Perceiving prenegotiations
rather as a learning process that should be utilized to the
maximum and trying to develop a personal relationship
increase the potential for a real movement from conflicting
unilateral approaches to joint efforts to formulate cooperative
multilateral solutions. This looser  conception of the prenego-
tiations can also be utilized to prevent surprises during the
formal course of the negotiations. Second, prenegotiations
are of a real practical meaning in case the parties share an

























solution of the mutual problem or take their time during the
prenegotiations to shift from a bargaining or a distributive
treatment of the disputed issue to a problem-solving or an
integrative one.
Identification of the component characteristics and indication
of the functions of prenegotiations will also be useful to improve
the practicality of the prenegotiation theory.
Stages
The different notions of when prenegotiation starts are reflect-
ed on the definition of its stages. I. W. Zartman and M. Berman
identify the first phase of the negotiation process as the ’diagnos-
tic stage’. They admit the beginning moment of the phase is not
usually clear-cut. The diagnostic phase lasts until the ’turning
point of seriousness’ when each party has perceived the other to
be serious about finding a negotiated solution and the second or
’formal phase’ begins. They warn that phases tend to gray around
the edges (Zartman & Berman, 1989, p. 3). They also admit:
what happens prior to prenegotiation is related to negotiation
too. But the initiation of the prenegotiation process, by defini-
tion and by nature, begins when one side considers the mul-
tilateral track as a possible alternative to the unilateral track to
solution in a conflict, and it continues into the next phase
when both parties reach that conclusion (Zartman and
Berman, 1989, p. 5).
Unlike them, Harold Saunder’s opening moment extends the
period prior to what Zartman and Berman consider the ’diagnos-
tic stage’. The first stage of the negotiation is ’defining the prob-
lem’ and it is linked by Saunders to the definition of interests and
objectives, i.e. to the issue of national political decision-making.
However, for the policy-maker looking toward negotiating resolu-
tion of a conflict, according to Saunders, the two are not separa-
ble. Unless and until the parties share some common definition of
the problem, the incoming negotiations will certainly fail
(Saunders, 1984, p. 51-52).
The second stage of prenegotiation by Saunders is the ’com-
mitment to negotiate’, i.e. reaching a commitment to a negotiat-
ed settlement. Before beginning to negotiate, the parties to an
issue first have to come to the judgment that the present situation
no longer serves their interests. Simultaneously they need to assess
that the substance of a fair settlement is available, it is manage-
able and if shaped – they could live with it. Overcoming suspicion
and accepting the balance of forces in many cases takes place at
this stage of prenegotiating (Saunders, 1984, p. 54-55).
Once parties have committed to negotiate, the third stage of58
prenegotiations follows – ’arranging the negotiation’. It has been
widely treated in the literature. Its central aim is to reach agree-
ment on the objectives and procedures for the negotiation.
Doctrinal debates, agreement on terminology, and details are
involved in this phase, which may last very long (Saunders, 1984,
p. 56).
According to Brian Tomlin the onset of the prenegotiation
process is marked by a turning point in their relations by adding
negotiation to the range of options being considered by one or
more of the parties involved. The first two stages in his five-stage
model precede the formal onset of the process of prenegotiation.
The first one is ’problem identification’, when at least one of the
parties adds negotiation to the array of options under considera-
tion caused by a restructuring of the values attached to alternative
outcomes by one or more of the parties in a relationship. In the
second stage, due to the ’search for options’, one of the parties
chooses negotiation as the preferred option, at least for the
moment. This stage may be a protracted one. The turning point
here is the choice of negotiation. The third stage of prenegotia-
tion, ’the commitment to negotiate’ by one party, marks the shift
from ’whether’ to negotiate to ’what’ will be negotiated.
Alternative negotiation scenarios, reflecting varying degrees of
scope for the potential negotiation, and possible successive steps
to increasing commitment to a negotiated solution to the policy
problem are characteristic of this stage. Determining the interests
of various parties, including those of domestic agencies and the
details of the internal dynamics gives way during this stage to a
consideration of the interests of the other parties to the potential
negotiation. The wish to begin defining the scope of the negotia-
tion motivates the shift of the attention of the parties. The turning
point of stage four – ’agreement to negotiate’, is the signaling of
a communication of a desire to negotiate by one party to the
other(s). It is in this stage that the parties must agree to pursue a
negotiated solution to the policy issue that divides them. The fifth
stage, the final one, of prenegotiation is ’setting the parameters’.
Although the parties may not reach agreement on all wished
parameters, their agreement to proceed with formal talks means
that the final stage simply merges into the first stage of the nego-
tiation process (Tomlin, 1989, p. 22-26).
Jay Rothman derives a three-phase model of prenegotiation:
“(i) framing – the process by which parties in conflict derive shared
definition about conflict parameters and build a will-to-negotiate;
(ii) inventing – the creation of cooperative strategies for solving
central aspects of the conflict as framed to build a confidence-in-
negotiation; and (iii) structuring – based on insights from framing
and inventing, parties make joint decisions about the variables
























and build a momentum-of-negotiation” (Rothman, June 1990,
p. 5).
J. G. Stein draws a conclusion that sequencing of stages in
a process of prenegotiation needs further examination...
Definition of a problem, although not shared diagnoses, and
search for options constituted the first two phases of the
process of getting to the table. The placement of the commit-
ment to negotiate in the sequence is more troublesome. The
evidence suggests that when leaders consider the process of
negotiation a high-risk option, with potentially large costs, the
reduction of uncertainty will dominate the process and order
the phases (Stein, 1989, p. 251).
The analysis of the prenegotiation process by using the stages
provides an opportunity to reconstruct the sequence of decisions
and interactions that lead two or more parties to attempt to nego-
tiate joint solutions on certain issues. This serves the better organ-
ization of the formal negotiation (Zartman, January 1988, p. 37;
Druckman, June 1986, p. 327-360; Tomlin, 1989, p. 25-26).
Even if this does not happen, certain stages have the poten-
tial to bring parties closer to understanding each other and at
least improve the chances of getting to a commitment to negoti-
ate.
The issue of the stages of prenegotiations assumes a particu-
lar importance in the different kinds of Balkan prenegotiation sit-
uations that need to lead to: a) coping with conflicts; b) tackling
post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation developments; c)
clearly constructive region-building activities. This is an important
issue that shows variation also in terms of applying the bargain-
ing or the problem-solving approach.
Functions
Understanding and improving the conduct of prenegotiations
are closely connected with the performed functions. I. W. Zartman
underlines the major focus of prenegotiation – the promotion of a
joint solution and a commitment to negotiate. J. G. Stein consid-
ers such a focus the creation of structures in which various kinds
of activities can take place: bargaining (integrative or distributive),
concession/convergence, etc. (Zartman, 1989, p. 6-14; Stein,
1989, p. 252-261).
The only function both I. W. Zartman and J. G. Stein thor-
oughly agree on is the ’selection of participants’ for the negotia-
tion. Otherwise they suggest different and practically significant
prenegotiation functions.
I. W. Zartman points to the following:

























er, even lowering the risk. Thanks to the exchange of infor-
mation by the parties the ’unknown’ is reduced, the risks of
wrong acts also decrease and there is knowledge what to
expect.
(2) Assisting and coming to terms with the costs of concessions
and agreement, as well as failure – before firm commitments
are made. A better understanding of the costs also reduces
the risks of the unknown.
(3) Convincing the other party that concessions will be requited,
not banked and run away with. The belief in reciprocity has
proved to be a key element in beginning negotiations. A uni-
lateral path to a solution may be easily blocked, if one of the
parties is sure the other will not repay concessions with con-
cessions (Zartman, 1989a). Both commitment and decision to
negotiate require requirement.
(4) Estimating and consolidating the internal support by each of
the parties, preparing the home front for a shift from a win-
ning to a conciliatory mentality. This is linked to efforts to
change the public image of the adversarial party, to put
together a domestic coalition of interests to support the termi-
nation of conflict.
Each of the sides has a role in the domestic politics of the
other. Reaching to the internal political process of the other
party and helping build a supportive coalition for accommo-
dation is an indispensable task of the side that first concluded
negotiation is a conceivable outcome. This coalition-building
with counterparts of the other side is an informal one.
J. G. Stein is very much of the same opinion. She considers
’management of domestic politics and coalition-building’ a
basic function of prenegotiation. One is rightly reminded of
Robert Putnam’s argument that politics of many international
negotiations can usefully be conceived as a two-level game:
domestic and international and the successful initiatives must
be in the ’win-sets’ of both games (Putnam, 1988, p. 427-
453). The prenegotiation process permits the parties to build
political support at home as well as to build transnational
coalitions.
(5) Selecting and discarding alternatives. This function of prene-
gotiation gives a chance to the parties to put aside some of
the salient possibilities for agreement, to avoid the worst alter-
natives and begin to focus on those that appear most prom-
ising.
This function very much overlaps with the two functions of
which J. G. Stein writes – ’specifying the boundaries of the
negotiation to follow’ and of ’setting (or delimiting) the agen-
da for the negotiation that follows’. The agenda creates pack-
























coalitions. Agenda definition is also an important part of the
risk management and a critical prerequisite of the commit-
ment to negotiate.
(6) A principal function of prenegotiation is to build bridges from
conflict to conciliation, to provide change in the perception,
mentality, tactics, definitions, acceptability levels and partners
that have already been discussed. Prenegotiation in the con-
text of this function, for example, may lead to temporarily sus-
pending the conflict activities, as well as to other forms of
building trust.
The analysis of prenegotiation through its functions provides
knowledge of the best formula and the respective details to be
reached during the negotiation. Very much this will be due to the
extended knowledge, the good results of the learning process that
prenegotiation constitutes – about the other parties, about their
interests, perceptions, etc. This aspect of the function-analysis of
prenegotiation in Southeastern Europe should be considered with
a special interest in light of the inadequate knowledge of the
issues and parties in the area.
Application: Relating Theory to the Case of the Balkans
1) The very analysis of the negotiation processes by the defi-
nitions, stages and functions of prenegotiations may largely stim-
ulate the thinking and approaches of the participants in the inter-
national relations in Southeast Europe (or the Balkans). The cog-
nitive structure and perspective of the foreign-policy makers in the
region and of those involved in the issues of the area assumes
important features that logically reflect on the relationship
between the parties. A multitude of theoretic and practical
’Balkan’ issues correlate. Here are two of these correlations:
a. Negotiations and prenegotiations are directly linked to the
foreign-policy decision-making processes of the local and exter-
nal to the region interested countries. Hence, through the specific
foreign-policy decision-making process of the different actors,
authorities of highest ranking are involved in the process of nego-
tiating and prenegotiating. The outcomes of this process reflect
the application of highest political authority and responsibility of
differing contents.
In this respect, however, a major breakthrough is needed: to
involve informal actors – NGOs and academic institutions, in the
difficult learning process with which prenegotiations are linked.
The foreign-policy decision-making process in and about the
Balkans needs to be democratized by bringing the nascent region-
al civil society and its expert community in the process of negoti-
ations and prenegotiations.

























politics in the different countries from and out of the region that
address and deal with ’Balkan’ issues. A useful reminder for the
students and practitioners of coping with these issues is the need
to differentiate among countries and domestic institutions. First,
from the onset of the conflicts in ex-Yugoslavia there have been
states that were not involved in conflict-generation. The Balkans is
not only Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, though military
force is there. Second, the political institutions, including the for-
eign-political authority and decision-making, are of varying
nature in the Balkan countries. Though most of the countries in the
region are democratic, there are differences in the proneness to
the ill effects of public opinion and nationalist sentiments in each
of them (Peterson, 1996).
2) The understanding of the functions of prenegotiation can
throw light on other ’interlocking’ concepts: management and
prevention of conflict, regime-maintenance and regime-building
(Zartman, 1989, p. 14-17; Stein, 1989, p. 239-244), involving
and interacting in organizations. All these concepts are funda-
mental for the task of coping with the major issues in the Balkans.
a. Negotiations and prenegotiations are vitally needed for the
management and prevention of conflicts and crises. Either a crisis
or the need to avoid an impending crisis usually leads to consid-
eration by the conflicting sides to the option to negotiate. J. G.
Stein writes about conflict management and crisis avoidance as of
factors that “trigger” the prenegotiation process, while I. W.
Zartman qualifies prenegotiation as crisis avoidance itself. An
important conceptual link between the theory of prenegotiations
and the need to prevent and manage conflicts in the Balkans is
the research study Coping with Conflicts in the Central and
Southern Balkans (Pantev, 1995). The study analyzes the
sources, classifies and outlines the structure and the development
of the Balkan conflicts. It also makes some conclusions and makes
policy recommendations. The fundamental idea of the conceptu-
al linkage is to shift the perception of the other party from an
“adversary” towards a “cooperative partner” in the course of the
prenegotiations. Within the different stages of prenegotiation a
new thinking should be formed that the solution of the ongoing
issues can be found with and not against the conflicting party. The
conflict-rich Balkan region is a fruitful terrain for exploring the
achievements of the prenegotiation theory, especially for the cases
of preventing violent conflicts. Each of the functions of prenegoti-
ation can be tested in the particular cases of the region for the
benefit of the individual countries’ foreign policies and of the area
in general.
b. I. W. Zartman points to a very significant conceptual rela-
tionship: Prenegotiation performs many of the same functions
























therefore, one might expect that prenegotiation would be less
necessary, shorter, or different in nature; even conflict
regimes, which provide rules of the game for the conduct and
limitation of hostilities, would offer a framework for building
and assessing many of the prenegotiation functions. Yet
regimes cover large areas of interaction, whereas the success
of negotiation depends on the identification of specific defini-
tions of problems, the selection of participants and alterna-
tives, and the establishment of parameters and agendas...
Thus, even within regimes, prenegotiation is necessary to
focus the ensuing process of agreement on appropriate items,
but this process should benefit from some of the work already
being done through the regime. One would want to avoid the
illusion that prenegotiation would therefore be ’easier  on
issues covered by regimes; it is hard to use a comparative
because there are no control cases for comparison, and the
prenegotiation may be difficult nonetheless. Indeed, prenego-
tiation within regimes may well be ’easier  only in the sense
that it would not have been possible at all if the terrain had not
been prepared by the regime (Zartman, 1989, p. 15).
Though the logic rather than the empirical testing, which is
quite occasional, proves this statement of I. W. Zartman, it is
nonetheless valuable because of the linkage established between
two major fields of social research – for a broad framework of
analysis such as regime and the study of processes and activities
of interaction such as negotiation. It is prenegotiation that pro-
vides the link.
J. G. Stein, analyzing the study of Gilbert R. Winham about
the prenegotiation phase of the Uruguay Round of GATT, con-
cludes that prenegotiation can almost be considered ’busi-
ness as usual , as part of a cyclical process in regime main-
tenance  (Stein, 1989, p. 240).
The construction or anticipated erosion of a regime, and
impending troubles relating to this, trigger the consideration of
launching or experiencing a new round of prenegotiation – either
as a strategy of building-up positive relationships or of crisis
avoidance.
The Balkans are a good example of the developing prerequi-
sites of a particular regime-building – of a ’security community’,
despite the parallel efforts of post-war regulation and prevention
of new violent conflicts. This issue has been particularly studied
and conceptualized (Pantev, 1994, p. 55-63; Pantev, 1995a, p.
33-37; Pantev, 1997, p. 10-13).
Each of the particular elements of the ’security community’
regime in the region requires further elaboration, interaction of

























cated prenegotiation activity is required to manage various risks,
to make preliminary judgments about the bargaining ranges and
reservation points of others without publicly committing to a nego-
tiation. Prenegotiation is needed for reducing the uncertainty and
managing complexity when there is a multiplicity of interests, par-
ties and roles. In particular circumstances, prenegotiations pro-
vide lower exit costs than formal negotiations would do.
In the prenegotiation phase the Balkan actors will have to
rethink many of their fundamental national security strategy
assumptions and formulae of ’national interests’ and of ’national
objectives’ to cope with the requirements of the regional security
community regime.
c. Probably the most politically desired aspect today of prene-
gotiations by the countries in the region is in regard to their per-
manent and stable involvement in successful economic, political
and military organizations2.
The institutional order established by an international organi-
zation with a positive record of efficiency is a much more prefer-
able option for the regional actors than a doubtful international
regime, which requires a lot of preconditions that neither of the
Balkan states (with the exception of Greece) can provide alone or
through a regional concert of nations. The core need of the
Balkan countries and people and of the region in general is to
overcome the economic and technological retardness, modernize
and catch up with the civilization ’center’ of developed countries.
All Balkan governments are confident the ’engine’ that will suc-
cessfully drive them is the group of Western organizations that
proved their effectiveness: the European Union (EU), NATO, the
Western European Union (WEU), OECD, the Council of Europe
(CE), and the World Trade Organization (WTO).
The whole range of prenegotiation activities that would bring
closer the formal acts of negotiation and involvement in these
organizations is of utmost importance and is a priority political
and national security strategy of all Balkan countries.
Considering the high financial costs of bringing the Balkan
countries in the family of successful Western institutions, the part-
ners from EU and NATO refrain from entering meaningful prene-
gotiation processes and prefer to participate in limited non-bind-
ing regime-building activities of certain aspects of a prospective
security community. The low level of involvement of both the EU
and the USA has very much to do with the broader geopolitical
and geoeconomic arrangements in the region that bring Russia
and Turkey to the table of eventual substantial negotiation and
prenegotiation activities.
The participation of all interested parties in the arrangement
of the regional order is not an impossible undertaking. Much
























the risks of involvement are successfully restricted and do not
overrun the costs – especially for the leading Western states –
members of the organizations in question. Certainly there are risks
of involvement in the affairs of Southeast Europe. But there are
also bigger risks of not doing it. The outburst of the Kosovo crisis
and the NATO strike against FRY showed retrognostically that
much more could have been achieved on the preventive side
about the conflict if major neighboring countries like Bulgaria and
Romania have been integrated more closely in both the EU and
NATO. The ongoing events in Kosovo signaled the start of a new
strategic approach of the Union and the Alliance to Southeastern
Europe. The negotiation and the prenegotiation instruments in
bridging this strategy with the keen interests of the local actors are
open for utilizing by those who are capable to do it.
The analysis of the political behavior of the Balkan states in
the post-Cold War period towards each other shows that the
vision of the neighbor through the ’bargaining’ lens tends to give
way to a problem-solving approach, motivated by the will to inte-
grate in the EU and NATO. The incentive of future membership in
these organizations stimulates the tendency of changing the per-
ception of the ’neighbor’ as of a future equal member in the EU
and ally in NATO. This leads to a change in the contents of the
discussions during the prenegotiations from normal and tradition-
ally exploited bargaining sessions to much more problem-solving
ones.
Mistrust, selective and distorted perceptions, negative atti-
tudes, poor communication, a competitive win-lose orientation
aiming to bring capitulation from the adversarial party have rarely
produced a well structured incoming negotiation process. On the
contrary, higher levels of escalation of conflicts and wars have
long haunted the aftermath of the initial political discourses in the
region.
Thanks to the incentive of homogenizing the political scene of
the Balkans by eventual joint membership in the same successful
economic, political and military organizations, there are high
chances the multitude of prenegotiation activities on various
issues to switch from the win-lose to the win-win cooperative prob-
lem-solving orientation. To get the job done an important catalyst
is required: the readiness of the EU and NATO and of their lead-
ing members to play effectively that role. Without external eco-
nomic, financial, political and institutional investment, the turning
point from a bargaining to a problem-solving attitude at the
prenegotiation phase and the very negotiations will be hardly
attained in the Balkans. This new wisdom for the regional actors
also stems from the lessons of the tragedies in Bosnia and Kosovo
– there is a realization that if a problem-solving negotiation

























in the conflicts the inevitable outcome could have been reached
at much lower costs than the wars caused.
This opportunity calls for two significant activities (Fisher,
1989, p. 206-238) that may support the prenegotiation interac-
tions in the direction of assuming a problem-solving approach –
especially for the cases of preventing new violent conflicts and of
solving other stability issues in the region:
First, utilizing the seminar and workshop3 experience of deal-
ing with particular issues in an informal way before relating to a
more formal treatment of the issue in the negotiation process. The
potential of joint analyzing and forecasting (Pantev, 1989, p. 219-
225) the development of the issue may additionally improve the
chances of giving-up hard bargaining in a zero-sum set of options
and drive through more knowledge of the consequences of posi-
tional bargaining to the thinking and practice of problem-solving.
Representatives of decision-making elites will be indispensable for
shaping the additional knowledge that is required – academics,
advisers, ex-high-ranking officials, politicians who have retired or
stepped-down from powerful positions, intelligence experts and
strategists who have a disposition to conceptual thinking.
The second opportunity is to utilize the third-party consultant
role for effective problem-solving prenegotiation aims. The major
external players in the Balkans – the EU, USA and Russia, may
undertake the functions of inducing motivations for problem-solv-
ing, improving the communication among the parties, assisting in
producing the diagnosis of the various issues and assisting the
interaction. The roles of aiding the regional actors to analyze and
deal with fundamental attitudes and issues in their relationship
undoubtedly sets standards of an internationally acceptable
behavior for the third-party consultants. At the end of the day all
should find creative problem-solving thanks to the improved com-
munication, analysis, prediction and knowledge of the issues at
stake.
Conclusions
1. Presently the Balkans are involved in several major region-
al initiatives that require negotiation activity: “the Sofia Process” of
the Balkan countries that started in July 1996 for stability, coop-
eration and security in the region; “the Royaumont Initiative” of
the EU, 1996, for stability and cooperation; “the Southeast
European Cooperative Initiative” (SECI) of the United States; and
a lot more that erupted on the eve and during the Kosovo crisis
and the strike against FRY. All they need is deeper conceptualizing
and structuring so that the theoretic potential of prenegotiation is
more intensively utilized.
























prenegotiation is required as well as additional deductions with
the objective of formulating a practical theoretic dictum about
what to do and seek during and from prenegotiation.
3. Improving the cognitive model of why and when during the
phases of prenegotiation the parties can abandon the normal bar-
gaining and move towards an integrative problem-solving strate-
gies and tactics. This is extremely important for learning how to
“teach” the states to rely more on cooperation in their interna-
tional relations, especially in Southeastern Europe.
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NOTES
1 P. Terrence Hopmann also writes of two visions on the issue without going into details.
2 Earlier studies of the conceptual, political, strategic and economic aspects of the rela-
tions of Bulgaria with Western organizations prove that presently the EU, NATO and
WEU are political targets for membership of top-priority for Albania, Bulgaria,
Croatia, Cyprus, FYROM, Romania, Slovenia and Turkey.
3 The activity of the Institute for East-West Studies, based in New York, Prague, Brussels,
Warsaw, Kyiv and Budapest and some of its recent programs in that area are very
close to these prenegotiation needs.
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